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THE MODERNIZATION OF EUROPEAN ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATORY
COMPETITION
Ben Depoorter*andFrancescoParisi*

INTRODUCTION

In today's economy, businesses are increasingly subject to the scrutiny
of multiple antitrust regulators. This is a logical consequence of a global
economy where business decisions impact several jurisdictions, but it also
results from the deliberate assignment of regulatory duties within and between antitrust systems.' Regulation 1/2003 of the European Commission
("EC" or "Commission") presents a landmark development in the decentralization of global antitrust enforcement.2 By increasing the involvement
of national courts and national competition authorities, 3 Regulation 1/2003
spreads antitrust powers in Europe throughout the Commission and twentyfour Member States.
Despite the obvious motive of decreasing its workload,4 the European
Commission's move toward decentralization is puzzling. The reform comes
at a time when the global consensus on law enforcement is shifting towards

* Visiting Professor, George Mason University School of Law and Professor of Law, Ghent
University. Ph.d., Ghent University (2003); J.D. (1999), M.A. (2000), Hamburg University, LLM.
(2003), J.S.D. (2005) Yale Law School. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Antitrust
Symposium held by George Mason Law Review and Howrey Simon Arnold & White LLP. Participants
of the symposium are gratefully acknowledged for their suggestions and comments. E-mail:
ben.depoorter@yale.edu.
** Professor of Law and Director, Program of Law and Economics, George Mason University
School of Law, and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Milan School of Law. E-mail: parisi@gmu.edu.

I

See generally MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY (2003).

2

See Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on

Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2002 O.J. (LI) 1 [hereinafter Reg. 1/2003].
For an overview of Regulation 1/2003; see generally MODERNISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION
LAW: THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FOR A NEW REGULATION IMPLEMENTING ARTICLES 81 AND 82
EC (Jules Stuyck & Hans Gilliams eds., 2002) [hereinafter MODERNISATION OF EUROPEAN
COMPETITION LAW].

3 Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, at 2.
4 On the Commission's selective enforcement in light of the imperative to lessen the workload,
see, e.g., Jo Shaw, Decentralizationand Law Enforcement in EC Competition Law, 15 LEGAL STUD.
128 (1995).
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centralization.' For instance, recent law enforcement disasters such as the
September 11th attack, in which enforcement agencies failed to share crucial information that could have prevented this tragedy, amply demonstrate
how supposed cooperation between administrative bodies often turns into
competition among these agencies. 6 The lack of communication between
enforcement agencies, particularly their failure to exchange vital information, has fueled a widespread belief that competition is not always optimal
when it involves complementary units of information.7
Historically, antitrust enforcement in the European Union has been
more centralized 8 than in the United States, where multiple administrative
and judicial bodies operate on the same level. Regulation 1/2003 decentralizes antitrust enforcement by eliminating notice requirements and investing
concurrent responsibilities for the application of Article 81(3) in national
courts and national competition authorities.9 The modernization of European antitrust law thus adds a new layer of overlapping intra-jurisdictional
competence to the existing multilayer inter-jurisdictional setting confronting multinationals. 10 In this article, we analyze the expected effects of regulatory overlap in European competition law resulting from Regulation
1/2003. We draw upon recently developed economic theories of regulatory
5 See text and sources cited infra note 6.
6 In its unanimous final report, the bipartisan 9/11 Commission recommends a historic restructuring of the nation's intelligence agencies. Specifically, the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Department of Defense, and National Security Council are criticized for their failures
in gathering and sharing intelligence. See Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: The Overview; 9/11
Report Calls for a Sweeping Overhaul of Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at Al. In the final
report, the 9/11 Commission recommends unifying law enforcement by centralizing strategic intelligence and operational planning and aligning intelligence community hierarchy with a new national
intelligence director and a National Counterterrorism Center. See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 399400 (2004), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911. Similarly, the Belgian Government created a
unified federal police force after the country was shocked to find that police and justice continually
refused to share information that could have resolved and saved lives in a large pedophilia murder case.
World News Briefs, Belgian PartiesAgree To Revise Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1998, at A4.
On the Dutroux scandal, see, e.g., Timothy W. Ryback, Four Girls Abducted, Raped, Murdered. A
Country on Trial,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997, at § 6, 42.
7 The analogy between these law enforcement disasters is enforced by the fact that European
antitrust regulation is shifting further towards the criminalization of antitrust enforcement. On this trend,
in the context of business cartels, see CHRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA, REGULATING
CARTELS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF LEGAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE DELINQUENCY (2003).
8 See PAUL B. STEPHAN ET AL., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 840-48

(2003).
9 Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, art. 3.
10 The ongoing development and employment of leniency programs on the national and the European federal levels further contributes to an increasingly fragmented cartel policy that encompasses
several overlapping jurisdictions. See CHRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA, REGULATING
CARTELS IN EUROPE: A STUDY OF LEGAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE DELINQUENCY 209-228 (2003).
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competition to analyze the effects of delegation of competence in the field
of antitrust enforcement.
Part I summarizes some of the main aspects of Regulation 1/2003's
regulatory overhaul. Part II employs economic theory to provide a new
taxonomy of regulatory competition. Part III applies the economic analysis
of regulatory competition to Regulation 1/2003. Part IV concludes with
some broader reflections.
I.

THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION OF REGULATION

1/2003

On May 1, 2004, a major reform of EC competition enforcement entered into force.11 Regulation 1/2003 established a new order for the enforcement of European Competition rules. 12 The crux of this modernization
authorizes joint enforcement of competition rules by the Commission's
Directorate-General of Competition, national courts, and national antitrust
authorities. The rule also abolished the notification system and provided for
the direct applicability of Article 81(3) in an attempt to ensure the "continued effective application"13 of competition rules in an enlarged European
Union. The main effect of this reform was the broader application of EC
competition rules by Member State courts and competition authorities.
A.

Removal of Notification

Prior to Regulation 1/2003, businesses were required, under certain
circumstances, to notify the Commission of cartel agreements and practices.14 The volume of notifications received soon exceeded the Commission's time and allegedly diverted the Commission's resources away from
the most serious antitrust infringements. 5 With Regulation 1/2003, the
S1IOn the same day, the European merger control system was also revamped. See Commission
Regulation 802/2004 of 7 April 2004 Implementing Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the Control
of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (L 133) 1.
12 See Reg. 1/2003, supra note 1, 1-25.
13 Philip Lowe, Current Issues of EU Competition Law: The New Competition Enforcement
Regime, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 567, 568 (2004).
14 For instance, Council Regulation 17/1962, 1962 J.O. (13) 204, art. 4 [hereinafter Reg. 17/62],
requires that undertakings notify the Commission of restrictive practices that fall under Article 81 of the
European Community ("EC") Treaty, but for which the undertakings seek an exemption from the
Commission. See generally STEPHAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 816-825.
15 Reg. 1/2003, supra note 1, at 1. Under EU competition law, the Commission was obliged to act
upon all notifications within a reasonable period. See Joined Cases T-213/95 & T-18/96, Stichting
Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf v. Commission, 1997 E.C.R. 11-1739, $ 55. To appreciate the Commission's workload, consider that the Commission received 40,000 notifications of agreements in the first
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Commission finally made good on its intention to eliminate the notice requirement.16 In doing so, European competition law moved from a standard
presumption of illegality to a default assumption of legality, where the burden of proof rests with either the party alleging a violation or government
antitrust authorities.17 Implicit in this reform is the idea that the meaning
and major precedents of European competition law have matured."5 The
elimination of the notice requirement has expanded the role of courts and
national competition authorities because, traditionally, notifications to the
European Commission delayed or postponed proceedings by national competition authorities and national courts.
B.

DecentralizedApplication ofArticle 81(3)

Regulation 1/2003 makes Treaty Articles 81 and 82 - regulating cartels and prohibiting abuse of market dominance, respectively - directly applicable in their entirety. The European Commission thus relinquished its
de facto exclusive jurisdiction over Treaty Articles 81 and 82. Significantly,
this includes the exemption provision in Article 81(3). 19 The Commission's
previous exclusive jurisdiction over Article 81(3) enabled it to navigate the
deep water of economic analysis and to set out major precedents in such
matters as concerted practices,20 the economic defense against predatory
pricing, 2' and other important issues. Although, historically, European
five years after passing Reg. 17/62.
16 On the debate over directly applicable exceptions versus centralized authorization, see Giuliano
Marenco, Does a Legal Exception System Require an Amendment of the Treaty?, in EUROPEAN
COMPETITION ANNUAL 2000: THE MODERNIZATION OF EC ANTITRUST POLICY 145, 145-184 (ClausDieter Ehlerman & Isabela Atanasiu eds., 2001). See also Rein Wesseling, The Commission White
Paperon Modernisation of E.C. Antitrust Law: Unspoken Consequences and Incomplete Treatment of
Alternative Options, 20 (8) EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 420 (1999).

17 See Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, at 2. However, even before Regulation 1/2003, the Commission's regular use of block exemptions created a de facto shift towards a presumption of legality with
regard to many types of agreements. See, e.g., Commission Notice on Exclusive Dealing Contracts with
Commercial Agents, 1962 J.O. (139) 2921, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition
/antitrust/legislation/edcen.html.
18 See, e.g., Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 2000 O.J. (C 291) 1; Commission Notice - Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2001 O.J. (C 3) 2. For a historical justification of the centralized notification and
authorization system, see WOUTER P.J. WILS, THE OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW,

Ch. 5, Section 6.2. (2002) (explaining that cartel prohibitions were revolutionary at the time of adoptation of Treaty Articles 81 and 82).
19 Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, art. 3.
20 Joined Cases 89, 104, 114, 116-17, 125-29/85, Re Wood Pulp Cartel: A Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio
v. Commission, 1998 E.C.R. 5193.
21 Case 27/76, United Brands v. Commission, 1978 E.C.R. 207.
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competition law has struggled to accommodate a rule of reason analysis
under Article 81(1),22 Article 81(3) has traditionally provided a platform to
weigh the economic effects of cartel agreements. Now, Regulation 1/2003
will induce decentralized application of the exemption provision, which
goes against the classic argument that national courts lack the expertise and
resources to evaluate sophisticated economic arguments in antitrust matters. 23 The Commission appears to believe that most major precedents in
Article 81(3) jurisprudence have already been announced, such that domestic courts will no longer be hindered by the complexity of a full-blown examination of economic issues in competition cases. Furthermore, the revitalization of the national competition authorities 24 - active in some Member
States while dormant in others - should provide assistance to competition
law enforcement at the Member State level.
C.

Antitrust Cooperation

Anticipating the dangers of fragmented application of competition
rules, the EC released a Modernization Package,2" which provides a number
of coordination and cooperation mechanisms for national courts, national
competition authorities, and the Commission. 26 To ensure coherent application of competition rules, the Commission will lead enforcement efforts by
concentrating on severe infringements, landmark cases, 27 and infringements
22 See, e.g., Valentine Korah, The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity-The Need for a Rule of
Reason in EEC Antitrust, 3 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 320 (1981).
23 See generally John D. Cooke, The Reform of Competition law Enforcement--Will it Work?, in
THE MODERNISATION OF EU COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: FIDE 2004
NATIONAL REPORTS 33-36 (Dermot Cahill ed., 2004).

24 Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, art. 5; see generallyCommission Notice on Cooperation Within the
Network of Competition Authorities, 2004 0. J. (C 101) 43.
25 The "Modernization Package" consists of the following implementing regulation and six accompanying notices: Commission Regulation 773/2004 of 7 April 2004 Relating to the Conduct of
Proceedings by the Commission Pursuant to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 2004 O.J. (L 123) 18;
Commission Notice on Cooperation Within the Network of Competition Authorities, 2004 O.J. (C 101)
43 [hereinafter Cooperation Within the Network]; Commission Notice on the Co-operation Between the
Commission and the Courts of the EU Member States in the Application of Articles 81 and 82 EC, 2004
O.J. (C 101) 54; Commission Notice on the Handling of Complaints by the Commission Under Articles
81 and 82 of the EC Treaty 2004 O.J. (C 101) 65; Commission Notice on Informal Guidance Relating to
Novel Questions Concerning Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty that Arise in Individual Cases (Guidance Letters), 2004 O.J. (C 101) 78 [hereinafter Guidance Letters]; Commission Notice - Guidelines on
the Effect on Trade Concept Contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 81;
Communication from the Commission - Notice - Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 97.
26 See sources cited supra, at note 25.
27 See Cooperation Within the Network, supra note 25, at 44-45.
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that affect more than three member states. 28 The supervisory role of the
Commission is expressed by the provision directing national competition
authorities to inform the Commission prior to or immediately following the
first formal act of investigation. 29 To facilitate cooperation, the Modernization Package creates information exchanges among national competition
authorities 30 and institutes a competition network that meets at regular intervals to discuss competition enforcement strategy. 31 At all times, the
Commission retains the right to intervene, 32 and national competition authorities are automatically relieved of their jurisdiction whenever the
Commission initiates its own proceedings.3 3
II.

THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: A NEW
TAXONOMY

In this part, we draw upon economic theory to provide an integrated
model of regulatory competition that can be applied to antitrust rules.34 The
taxonomy of the various modalities of regulation provides a useful framework for analyzing the reform of competition enforcement in Europe. We
shall apply this taxonomy to the discussion of antitrust reform in Part III.
A.

Positive Versus Negative Regulation

Regulatory activity usually occurs in two forms. Regulation is positive
when a regulator can act to permit a certain activity that is otherwise not
allowed. When a firm wishes to partake in a certain activity, it must obtain
28 Id. 14.
29 Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, art. 11; Cooperation Within the Network, supra note 25, 1 45. The
interaction is two-way. Likewise, the Commission informs the national competition authorities of the
documents it has collected in its investigate process. See, e.g., Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, at 4.
30 Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, at 4. The particulars are contained in the Commission Notice on
Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities. See Cooperation Within the Network,
supra note 25.
31 See Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, at 4. The declaration of intention reads as follows: "The Commission and the competition authorities of the Member States should form together a network of public
authorities applying the Community competition rules in close cooperation. For that purpose it is necessary to set up arrangements for information and consultation. Further modalities for the cooperation
within the network will be laid down and revised by the Commission, in close cooperation with the
Member States." Id.
32 Cooperation Within the Network, supra note 25,
50-57.
33 Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, 17.
34 See generally Francesco Parisi et al., Two Dimensions of Regulatory Competition (George
Mason Law & Economics Working Paper No. 03-01, 2004), available at http://www.gmu.edu
/departments/law/faculty/papers/docs/03-0 I.pdf.
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permission from the regulator. This includes, for instance, the issuance of
permits or licenses by a regulator. In these cases, there is a presumptive
general prohibition against an activity that can be overcome through the
regulator's positive action. In contrast, regulation is negative when a regulator can act to prohibit an otherwise permissible activity. Examples include
issuing prohibitory rules or inserting a "black list" in regulatory guidelines.
Under normal circumstances, the absence of restriction equals permission, while the absence of permission equals prohibition. Thus, for example, failing to permit an activity is equivalent to prohibiting it. Recent models in economic theory demonstrate, however, that when we account for the
existence of multiple regulatory bodies, positive versus negative actions
lead to different overall outcomes.35 As we will see in Part III, Regulation
1/2003's abandonment of notice requirements and decentralization of exemption jurisdiction are not neutral procedural moves. Such institutional
changes are likely to affect the direction of substantive competition law.
B.

ConcurrentVersus Alternative Competence in Antitrust

Within a single antitrust agency, a firm simply acquires regulatory input (positive or negative) from the designated agency. But when multiple
antitrust agencies are involved, an individual might be required to secure
multiple regulatory inputs or might be able to choose among alternative
regulatory inputs. In multi-agency settings we can further distinguish between concurrent and alternative antitrust competences. With concurrent
competences, the action of all competent antitrust agencies is necessary to
bring about their collective action, whereas with alternative competences
the action of just one antitrust agency is sufficient to give effect to its activity.

Positive

Alternative
(Substitutes)

Concurrent
(Complements)

Any regulator
can permit

Every regulator
should permit

Any regulator
can prohibit

Every regulator
should prohibit

Figure 1. Four Dimensions of Regulation
35 Parisi et al., supra note 34; see also Norbert Schulz et al., Fragmentationin Property: Towards
a GeneralModel, 159 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 594-613 (2002).

HeinOnline -- 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 315 2004-2006

GEO. MASON L. REV.

[VOL. 13:2

In Figure 1, we map both dimensions together. The italic font indicates the allocation of regulatory competence: alternative versus concurrent. The bold font indicates the content of the action: positive versus negative.
C.

Allocation ofAntitrust Competence andRegulatory Externalities

The relevance of this taxonomy becomes clear when we consider the
interaction between both dimensions, taking into account externalities in
the antitrust regulatory process. Differing allocations of antitrust competence are important due to the existence of positive and negative regulatory
externalities.36
1.

Positive Externalities in Antitrust Regulation and Enforcement

Positive externalities in antitrust regulation and enforcement occur in
(a) concurrent and positive regulatory action, and (b) concurrent and negative regulatory action. With concurrent and positive action, the activity of
one antitrust regulator increases the value and the exploitable rent of the
other. For instance, a merger with global impact requires the approval of
antitrust authorities in the United States and the European Union.37 The
clearance of the merger by the U.S. Department of Justice creates a positive
externality by increasing the value of the second approval of the European
Commission.
A positive externality also occurs when the antitrust regulatory activity
is concurrent and negative. For example, suppose the national competition
authorities of France and Germany are pursuing a restrictive practice in
their territories and the action of one is not sufficient to bring the entire
infringement to an end or to sanction it adequately. In these circumstances,
the completion of tasks by the French agency will effect a positive externality by increasing the exploitable rents to the German agency.
The important point to note is that where externalities arise, an individual antitrust agency does not take into account the effect of its conduct
on other regulatory bodies. Thus, positive externalities will be underpro-

36 See Parisi et al., supra note 34.
37 See Thomas B. Leary, A Comment on Merger Enforcement in the United States and in the
European Union, Remarks Before the Transatlantic Business Dialogue Principals Meeting (Oct. 11,
2001), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/tabdO1O1I1.htm.
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vided because the party that produces the externality only accounts for the
effect of its action on itself.38
2.

Negative Externalities in Antitrust Regulation and Enforcement

Negative externalities in antitrust regulation and enforcement occur in
an institutional setting where competences are (a) alternative and positive,
and (b) alternative and negative. With alternative and positive regulatory
action, the action of one antitrust agency reduces the value and exploitable
rent of another agency. This occurs when two antitrust agencies have the
power to grant licenses to operate a business and firms need permission
from only one of the antitrust authorities. For example, if a firm receives a
fine reduction from the French national competition authority, this dissipates the value of a subsequent leniency fine reduction by the Belgian national competition authority.39
When regulatory activity is alternative and negative, a first regulatory
restriction creates a negative externality by making a second restriction
irrelevant, since a second prohibition can add no further loss. For instance,
when several competition authorities are investigating the same agreement
or practice, a conviction by one national competition authority will lead the
national competition authorities in other Member States to discontinue their
proceedings since a second prohibition cannot add any further loss. When
negative externalities are involved, activities tend to be overprovided because the party that exerts the externality does not account for the negative
effect of his behavior on others.
3.

Competition in Antitrust Regulation and Enforcement

Contrasting the four different scenarios, we obtain the following effects:

38

Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & EcON. 144 (1960).

39

Commission Notice on Immunity from Fines and Reduction of Fines in Cartel Cases, 2002 O.J.

(C 45) 3; see also Cooperation Within the Network, supra note 25,

37-42.
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Positive

Alternative
Competence
(Substitutes)

Unified
Competence

Concurrent
Competence
(Complements)

Over-Permitted

maximizing

Under-

level X*

Permitted

maximizing

Under-

level X*

Restricted

Competence

Negative
Competence

Over-Restricted

Figure 2. Allocation of Antitrust Regulatory Power
Applied to the antitrust setting, our model suggests that the choice of
positive versus negative regulatory instruments implies different outcomes
for antitrust law. Because of regulatory externalities, splitting competences
leads to inefficiency compared to action by a single agency.40 If singlebody decision-making is not feasible-an assumption driving Regulation
1/2003-the positive power of a court (to grant an exemption) is not the
flip side of its negative power (finding of infringement). 4 1 Negative externalities involving exemptions lead to a greater number of exemptions and
thus a more lenient and permissive antitrust regime. Negative externalities
involving findings of infringement lead to a higher degree of convictions,
creating a more stringent antitrust enforcement system.
The study of the equilibrium level of antitrust regulation and enforcement should be further carried out in light of the potential for mutual scrutiny and checks-and-balances induced by the alternative regimes. The allocation of antitrust authority and the choice of instrument, in fact, also lead
to different results with respect to possible regulatory or enforcement errors. When allocating negative (alternative) regulatory competences, antitrust regulation is more likely to condemn business practices that are effi-

40 For a formal exposition of this effect, see Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, IntraJurisdictional Tax Competition (George Mason Law & Economics Working Paper No. 03-16, 2004),
available at http://www.gmu.edu/departments/law/faculty/papers/docs/03-16.pdf.

On the other hand,

regulatory competition may carry monitoring benefits in the fact that different agencies' performances
provide information to the legislator. See Yoshiro Miwa & Mark J. Ramseyer, Toward a Theory of
Jurisdictional Competition: The Case of the Japanese FTC (Harvard Law and Economics Discussion
Paper No. 482, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=615565. Similarly, the competition between

national antitrust authorities might keep the European Commission vigilant.
41 Klick & Parisi, supra note 40.
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cient and beneficial to consumers (type I errors or false positives). When
allocating positive (alternative) competences, regulators are more likely to
wrongly excuse anti-competitive conduct (type II errors or false negatives).
With this understanding in place, we are ready to analyze the probable
effects of Regulation 1/2003.
III.

A.

RETHINKING REGULATORY COMPETITION IN EUROPE

Externalities in a DecentralizedExemptions Policy

Regulation 1/2003 moves the Article 81(3) exemptions process from a
system of central authorization4 2 toward a system of multiple positive (alternative) authorities. As explained in the preceding part, alternative positive regulatory action creates negative externalities. The action of one antitrust enforcer reduces the value and exploitable rent of the other agency. In
the context of exemptions, an exemption by one court dissipates the value
of a second exemption by courts in other Member States. These negative
externalities will be overprovided because the first court does not account
for the effect of its decision on other courts. Thus, the direct applicability of
the exemption provision of Regulation 1/2003 is likely to increase the overall amount of exemptions.
B.

Selective Litigation and Forum Shopping

Although the European Commission retains some residual authority to
correct major discrepancies,4 3 the parallel execution of competition law'
will most likely produce greater non-uniformity in the enforcement of
European competition law. Compounding this problem, the reform removes
the notice requirement; thus, plaintiffs are left with the exclusive decision
to file and select the forum. Plaintiffs will most likely file infringement

42 See generally Reg. 17/62, supra note 14.
43 See Cooperation Within the Network, supra note 25,
43. (national competition authorities
must respect decisions which are already the subject of a Commission decision). See generally Reg.
1/2003, supra note 2, at 1-25.
44 The Commission Notice on Cooperation Within the Network of Competition Authorities expressly provides for parallel action by two or three national competition authorities "when an agreement
or practice has substantial effects on competition mainly in their domestic markets and the action of
only one NCA would not be sufficient" to terminate and sanction the infringement adequately. Cooperation Within the Network, supra note 25, 12.
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claims in jurisdictions that have a reputation as strict enforcers.45 Such forum-shopping is asymmetric because defendants have no comparable ability to influence the choice of jurisdiction.46 This will bring more cases into
more exacting jurisdictions. 47 Thus, to the extent that there is a non-uniform
application of Article 81 across national competition authorities and national courts,48 this creates incentives for selective litigation of antitrust
cases, leading to overall stricter levels of competition enforcement.49
C.

Enforcement by Multiple NationalCompetition Authorities

When regulatory activity is alternative and negative, such as when
Member States' courts make findings of infringements, a first regulatory
restriction makes the second restriction irrelevant, since a second prohibition can add no further loss. Regulation 1/2003 induces this type of negative regulatory externality because revitalized national competition authorities will add a parallel competition enforcement layer. Because infringement findings increase with the number of involved parties, Regulation
1/2003 can be expected to increase total negative externalities.
D.

InstitutionalDesign: CorrectingRegulators' Incentives

The nature of the regulatory body determines what type of allocation
will result in over- and under-enforcement of antitrust laws. If regulators
are primarily rent-seeking, the model provides insight into what structure
45 See Francesco Parisi & Kimberly Moore, Rethinking Forum Shopping in Cyberspace, 77 CHIKENT L. REv. 1325 (2002) (modeling the strategic interaction between plaintiffs and defendants in the
context of cyberspace).
46 See id. The problem is exacerbated because, in the case of transnational infringements, national
biases by national competition authorities also work unidirectionally towards stricter enforcements. That
is, under the current rules, national competition authorities could be excessively aggressive toward
foreign undertakings but not more lenient towards domestic undertakings because, in the case of refusals to prosecute domestic undertakings, complainants still have the option to bring their complaint
before the Commission, national courts, or national competition authorities of another Member State.
47 Similarly, where judges have varying ideologies, case selection might provide a possible explanation for the expansion of the domain of legal remedies and causes of action in torts over time. See
Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Litigationand the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model, 116
PUB. CHOICE 419 (2003); Vincy Fon, Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, Litigation, JudicialPathDependence, and Legal Change, EUR. J. L. & ECON. (forthcoming), available at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/faculty/papers/docs/02-26.pdf.
48 On the unpredictability and imperfections of antitrust decision-making by courts, see Frank H.
Easterbrook, AllocatingAntitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L. J. 305, 306 (1987).
49 This effect is amplified by the freedom of Member States to impose stricter national rules of
competition regulation, including criminal sanctions. See Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, at 2.
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will temper the (ab)use of their power: positive regulatory action should be
assigned with alternative regulatory competence, and negative regulatory
action should be assigned with concurrent regulatory competence. Both
conditions will induce lower levels of regulatory action (taking a singlebody regulator as the benchmark).
In contrast, if we assume that regulators shirk their duties and lack the
proper incentives to engage in effective regulatory action, negative regulatory action should be assigned with alternative regulatory competence, and
positive regulatory action should be assigned with concurrent regulatory
competence. These two conditions will encourage higher levels of regulatory activity (again taking a single-body regulator as the benchmark).
E.

Replicating the Flaws of the United States Model

Multiplication of veto powers is a problem for conducting business,
especially in dynamic industries with high rates of innovation.50 In many
respects, Regulation 1/2003's reform of EC competition enforcement recalls federal competition issues in United States law.51 The European Union
has previously avoided the pitfalls of the U.S. antitrust system,5 2 in which
there are
"dozens of institutions that can say 'no' but not one that can say
'yes.' 5 3 Traditionally, the Commission provided some legal certainty
through comfort letters and informal decisions upon notification. These
decisions are comparable to the U.S. Commission of Internal Revenue's
private revenue rulings or to the Securities and Exchange Commission's
"no action" letters.54 Although the European Commission's informal decisions provided somewhat shaky legal protection against domestic action, at
least they bound the enforcer-unlike the U.S. system.55 In this regard, the
50 Judge Posner refers to the tendency of antitrust litigation to create multiple lawsuits out of a
single dispute as a "cluster-bomb effect." RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 279 (2d ed. 2001). The
main results, according to Posner, are lengthened lawsuits, complicated settlement, magnified uncertainty engendered by the litigation, and increased litigation costs. See id.
at 279-80.
51 See generally Richard Posner, Keynote Address at American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, Symposium, The New Antitrust Paradox: Policy Proliferation in the Global Economy
(Apr. 21, 2003), availableat http://www.techlawjoumal.com/atr/20000914posner.asp.
52 See, e.g., Thomas, C. Arthur, The Unsatisfactory Application of the Antitrust Statutes of the
United States by the Federal Courts, in MODERNISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW, supra note
2, at 61-77.
53 Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopolization: Past, Present, Future, 61 ANTITRUST L. J. 99, 109
(1992).
54 Id.at 110.
55 For a concise description of the U.S. antitrust laws and operating authorities, see Barry A.
Pupkin & Ian R. McPhie, United States of America, in DEALING WITH DOMINANCE 287-308 (Nauta
Dutilh ed., 2004).
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elimination of the notice requirement creates the risk of increased overall
uncertainty.56
F.

The UnbearableLightness of Democracy in Antitrust Enforcement

The analysis set out here is subject to a disclaimer in that the two dimensions of regulatory competition collapse into one when the different
regulatory bodies act as one. To some extent the distortions described
above can be minimized through close coordination in the European Competition Network. 57 A similar opportunity for unified action is through the
Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions,
which is composed of representatives of national competition authorities.
Regulation 17 installed this body as a forum to discuss cases that are being
handled by Member States' national competition authorities.58
Nonetheless, these rules and provisions of coordination do not amount
to much more than mere declarations of intention. Commission commitment decisions do not bind national courts and national competition authorities.59 Commission Guidelines are likewise not legally binding. While
national competition authorities may suspend a proceeding when another
national competition authority is dealing with a case, they have "no obligation to do so.''6° The case allocation provisions are merely indicative criteria, 61 and, as always, Member States remain free to impose more stringent
competition rules and penalties. As such, Regulation 1/2003 and the reform
package set no strict binding rules that mandate coordination among national competition authorities. Although the Commission continues to lead
the way,62 one cannot escape the impression that Regulation 1/2003 fosters
conditions for political democracy to seep into antitrust enforcement. Na56 The Commission hopes to address this issue through the use of informal guidance letters. However, in all but exceptional circumstances, the Commission does not formally guarantee that such letters
will be provided upon request. See Guidance Letters, supranote 25,
5, 7-8.
57 See Cooperation Within the Network, supranote 25.
58 Reg. 17/62, supra note 14.
59 Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, at 5.
60 See Reg. 1/2003, supra note 2, art. 13; Cooperation Within the Network, supra note 25, JR 2022.
61 Philip Lowe, Current Issues of EU Competition Law: The New Competition Enforcement
Regime, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 567, 573 (2004).
62 In a few instances, the Commission retains exclusive jurisdiction of an infringement claim.
Particularly when (1) the targeted agreement or practice affects competition in cross-border markets
covering more than three member states, and (2) cases where the Commission is "particularly well
placed" to handle a case (because of a link with other Community provisions, novel competition issues,
or developing issues of competition law). See Cooperation Within the Network, supra note 25, %1415. These provisions should limit the most severe aberrations of a fragmented EU competition law.
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tional competition authorities are allowed to pursue domestic sensitivities,63
and hierarchical modes of governance are replaced with voluntary cooperation and coordination. 6
The manner in which Regulation 1/2003's vision of "coordination"
plays out in practice will determine the extent of the effects described in
this Article. One must take into consideration the full range of regulatory
competition effects when developing an informal working order among the
multiple European competition regulators. The "multiplication of interpreters '65 could significantly increase the risks and costs of businesses. Because
these heightened costs translate into higher end-prices for consumers, careless implementation of Regulation 1/2003 might defeat the very purpose of
antitrust law.
CONCLUSION

The European Commission's Modernization Package has altered EU
antitrust regulation from a system of unitary positive regulatory action to a
system of multiple negative regulatory actions. By removing notice requirements and installing a system of parallel powers with a directly applicable exemption system, Regulation 1/2003 tips the balance of European
Union antitrust enforcement towards twenty-four national courts and national competition authorities.
Our model foresees a number of qualitative adjustments resulting from
this reform. On one hand, the direct applicability of the exemption provision should increase the overall amount of exemptions. On the other hand,
a decentralized system permits private litigants' forum shopping, and parallel enforcement by multiple national competition authorities will drive up
the number of infringement findings. Although the precise direction of substantive competition law is unclear, the overall effect is higher levels of
regulatory activity. This entails not only greater administrative costs but
also suggests increased transaction costs for doing business in the postRegulation 1/2003 European Union. Faced with several parallel layers and
strategic competitor litigants, businesses are likely to incur higher expenses
for legal counsel and litigation.

63

But see WOUTER P.J. WILS, TOPIc 2: EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY: THE

22 (Community Report, FIDE
DUBLIN 33, 2004) (concluding that there is little room for political discretion in the application of competition law).
64 See supra Part I.C.
65 See Easterbrook, supra note 53, at 110.
REFORM OF COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT-WILL IT WORK?
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